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ABSTRACT
Building on previous work on racial attitudes among the religious, this study reassesses
the effects of religion on individuals’ beliefs about racial inequality. This study relies on recent
developments in the sociology of culture, which conceives of culture as a frame through which
individuals interpret the world in which they inhabit (Benford and Snow 2000; Harding 2007;
Small 2002, 2004). Religion is held to be an important social institution that provides substance
to the frames that individuals employ for interpreting racial inequality. Two particular
developments from this literature inform this study: first, that individuals can employ different,
even contradictory, frames simultaneously, and second, that frames are dynamic processes that
can change over time. This study utilizes the General Social Survey from 1985 to 2008 and uses
a theoretically informed and improved methodology for assessing beliefs about racial inequality.
Three conclusions are drawn: 1) religion continues to play a role in shaping individuals’ beliefs
about racial inequality, 2) it is important to differentiate between “pure” frames and frames that
combine different explanations for racial inequality when understanding the role of religion in
forming beliefs about black-white inequality, and 3) frames for racial inequality undergo change
over time, though the pattern of change depends upon the frame for racial inequality.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the twentieth century, Du Bois (1999 [1903]) wrote that “the problem of
the twentieth century is the color line” (34). Into the twenty-first century, this problem persists.
Racial stratification in the United States has resulted in the creation of an African American
underclass (Massey and Denton 1993) that experiences disproportionately high rates of poverty,
incarceration, and poor health, as well as disproportionately low levels of educational attainment
(Bobo and Smith 1998). The gap between average white and black wealth has nearly quadrupled
in the last 25 years, rising from $20,000 in 1984 to $97,000 in 2007 (Shapiro, Meschede, and
Sullivan 2010).
One question that has interested researchers is what explanations people offer for these
racial inequalities. That is, do people offer individualist explanations that hold African
Americans responsible for their own socioeconomic disadvantage or do people believe that racial
inequality is structuralist in nature, caused by such things as a lack of educational opportunities
or discrimination (Feagin 1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan
1997). Beliefs about inequality are of consequence because links have been found between
beliefs about racial inequality and solutions to this inequality. Holding that racial inequality is
due to structural causes increases the likelihood that individuals will support structural (i.e.,
government) solutions (Kluegel 1990), while holding African Americans responsible for their
own disadvantage may increase the likelihood of opposing structural solutions (Krysan 2000).
The publication of Divided by Faith by Emerson and Smith (2000) has invigorated a
discussion about the role that religion plays in forming individuals’ beliefs about the causes of
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black-white inequality. Informed by the sociology of culture literature, Emerson and Smith have
argued that religion plays an important role in shaping individuals’ beliefs about racial
inequality. In particular, they look at the role of evangelicalism in providing white evangelicals
with the cultural tools (Swidler 1986) of individualism and anti-structuralism that ultimately
informs their beliefs about racial inequality. The result, Emerson and Smith (2000) argue, is that
evangelicals are more likely to attribute racial inequality to individualist explanations and less
likely to support structuralist explanations. Research building on the work of Emerson and
Smith lends broad support to Emerson and Smith’s findings about evangelicals (Hinojosa and
Park 2004; Tranby and Hartmann 2008). This research has also looked beyond evangelicalism
to understand the role of other religious denominations and other religious factors in shaping
individuals’ beliefs about racial inequality (Edgell and Tranby 2007; Hinojosa and Park 2004).
Relying on the sociology of culture literature and building on previous research, this
study explores the ways that religious affiliation contributes to the ways that individuals frame
racial inequality. Benford and Snow (2000) have argued that culture provides frames, or
interpretive schemes, through which individuals understand the world around them. These
frames are shaped and informed by experiences and the social institutions in which individuals
participate, including religion (Harding 2007). Thus, it stands to reason that those who identify
with different religious traditions may have racial attitudes that are informed by these traditions.
There are two new contributions that the framing literature can make to understanding the
role of religion in shaping how individuals frame racial inequality. The first is the idea that the
availability of multiple frames within a culture means that different, even seemingly
contradictory, frames can be combined (Harding 2007). With regard to the way religion informs
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racial inequality, this means that religiously affiliated individuals may hold individualist and
structuralist frames simultaneously. The second is that frames are dynamic processes that can
change over time (Small 2002). Thus, it is possible that the frames religious individuals use to
interpret racial inequality may change over time in light of larger cultural trends. Two cultural
shifts provide an impetus for exploring changes over time in the ways religious individuals
interpret racial inequality. First, Hunt (2007) has identified larger trends toward individualist
explanations for racial inequality. This raises questions about whether this conservative shift is
evenly distributed among all groups or if certain groups are more susceptible to shifts toward
more conservative racial attitudes. Second, Hout and Fischer (2002) have identified a shift in the
1990s away from institutional religion to non-affiliation, with political liberals and moderates
fleeing organized religion. If fewer liberals and moderates are identifying with mainstream
religious affiliations, it may be that certain religious groups as a whole are becoming more
conservative in their views of racial inequality.
Following previous research (Edgell and Tranby 2007; Hinojosa and Park 2004), this
project relies on the denominational scheme of Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robinson, Wilcox,
and Woodberry (2000) to further assesses the role of religion in shaping beliefs about racial
inequality. On one hand, this project is a reassessment in that it seeks to understand the impact
of religion on racial inequality by using an improved methodology that distinguishes between
those who use pure individualist and structuralist explanations and those who combine
individualist and structuralist explanations for racial inequality. On another hand, this project
enters new terrain by exploring how the frames that denominations use to interpret racial
inequality may be changing over time.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Beliefs about Racial Inequality
Racial inequality persists in America despite the belief that whites and blacks should be
treated equally in all spheres of life, including housing, education, jobs, and public transportation
(Schuman et al. 1997). Given the persistence of inequality despite the principled belief that
whites and blacks are equal, researchers have been interested in the explanations that individuals
offer to explain racial inequality.
Researchers have placed explanations for black-white inequality into different categories.
The two most frequently utilized categories are individualist and structuralist explanations. 1
Individualist explanations locate the cause of black-white inequality in the individual (Feagin
1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman et al. 1997). Such explanations include the belief that
black disadvantage is caused by a lack of inborn-ability or the lack of motivation, effort, or will.
The second type of explanation locates racial inequality in “historical or institutional causes”
(Hunt 2007:391) that are external to the individual. These include such beliefs as a lack of
educational opportunities or discrimination against African Americans.
Understanding what people believe about the causes of inequality is important because
scholars have identified a connection between individuals’ beliefs about racial inequality and the
solutions they offer for ameliorating inequality. Structuralist beliefs about the cause of racial
inequality have been found to be a strong predictor of structural solutions (Kluegel 1990). That
is, those who believe that structural barriers perpetuate racial inequality are more likely to
1

Feagin (1975) and Hunt (2002) have also looked at the religious belief that poverty and inequality might result
from God’s will. Due to the unavailability of such questions in the data set being employed in this study, this
explanation for inequality cannot be included.
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support structural solutions (i.e., government implementation) that might dismantle those
barriers. On the other hand, individualist beliefs about the causes of inequality have been linked
to opposition to structural solutions. Those who believe that individuals are to blame for their
own disadvantage are less likely than others to support the implementation of policies that may
alleviate racial inequality (Hunt 2007; Krysan 2000).
It is important to note that individualist and structuralist beliefs are not mutually
exclusive. Past research on beliefs about racial inequality has often relied on one survey
question that ask respondents to choose from a list of possible reasons for differences between
whites and blacks in areas such as jobs, housing, and income. The responses available to
respondents utilize words such as “mainly” or “mostly.” For example, responses ask if
respondents believe if racial inequality is “mainly due to discrimination” or because “most
blacks just don’t have the motivation.” Kluegel (1990) has argued that using “mainly” and
“most” seem to imply the answers are mutually exclusive. Yet, as Hunt (2007) found, over 25%
of respondents combine individualist and structuralist explanations.
The literature offers possible reasons why individuals combine different types of
explanations. One possible reason is that ambivalence may be one of the defining characteristics
of contemporary racial attitudes, particularly among whites (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Kluegel and
Smith 1986). Another possible reason is that racial and ethnic minorities may be more likely
than whites to combine individualist and structuralist explanations for racial inequality due to a
“dual consciousness” that derives from their experience as members of subordinated racial
groups. Even though racial and ethnic minorities may experience discrimination, both
interpersonal and institutional, they also participate in a culture that emphasizes individual effort
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as a prerequisite for success (Hughes and Tuch 2000; Hunt 1996; Hunt 2007). Thus, racial
minorities may believe that discrimination is a contributing factor to socioeconomic
disadvantage while also believing that individual effort is necessary to counter discrimination
(Hughes and Tuch 2000; Hunt 1996).
Cultural Frames
Emerson and Smith (2000) have renewed an interest in the role religion plays in forming
racial attitudes by exploring the role of religion in forming beliefs about racial inequality. Like
Emerson and Smith and others who have looked at the role of religion in forming attitudes and
shaping actions (Barnes 2005; Keister 2003; Pattillo-McCoy 1998), I turn to recent
developments in the sociology of culture (Hart 1996) to understand the role religion might play
in forming beliefs about racial inequality.
Scholars have used different cultural models to explore the role of religion in forming
attitudes and influencing decision making, from Swidler’s (1986) idea of culture as a tool kit
(Barnes 2005; Emerson and Smith 2000; Keister 2003; Pattillo-McCoy 1998) to Benford and
Snow’s (2000) notion that culture functions as a frame for interpreting the world in which one
inhabits (Barnes 2005). For this present study, I rely on the framing approach, as I believe that
this approach provides simplicity, clarity, and maneuverability absent in other approaches. 2
Benford and Snow (1992) define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and
condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations,
events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment” (137).
2

Lamont and Small (2008) argue that Swidler’s (1986) notion of culture as a tool kit loses some clarity and
simplicity due to slippage of terminology. I find the metaphor of culture as a lens through which an individual looks
at the world to be less cumbersome than the metaphor of culture as a tool kit.
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As interpretive schemes, frames function as lenses through which individuals make sense of
events and “how the world works” (Harding 2007). This presumably includes how people make
sense of and interpret the existence of racial inequality. Individuals and groups make sense of
racial inequality by peering through lenses that have been formed through experiences, social
interactions, and participation in social institutions. One such institution is religion (Harding
2007).
In addition to frames having an interpretive quality, there are other characteristics of
frames that are relevant for exploring the role religion plays in shaping beliefs about inequality.
First, frames have a moral quality. They “identify problems and assign blame, provide solutions
or strategies, and provide a rationale for engaging in action” (Harding 2007:346). With regard to
racial inequality, an individualist frame can be seen as an approach to racial inequality that holds
African Americans responsible while a structuralist frame places blame on external factors such
as discrimination. In addition to assigning blame, frames say something about the solutions
individuals support (Kluegel 1990; Krysan 2000). Second, the complexity of social life and the
availability of multiple frames within a culture mean that individuals can hold multiple, even
contradictory, frames simultaneously (Harding 2007). Individuals can and do combine
individualist and structuralist explanations for racial inequality. Third, frames are dynamic, not
static and fixed (Benford 1997; Harding 2007; Small 2002; 2004). Small (2002) has described
framing as a process that requires “reinforcement mechanisms” because “the contents ...are
bound to change as individuals’ and collectivities’ lives change” (37). As lives change and as
the world that individuals and groups inhabit changes, frames can undergo change. Finally,
frames are an important, but not the sole, factor in determining action (Lamont and Small 2008;
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Small 2002). While it is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that individualist
and structuralist frames may play a role in determining action to combat racial inequality.
The Effect of Religion on Frames for Racial Inequality
Emerson and Smith (2000) have argued that while Americans as a collective are largely
individualist and anti-structuralist with regard to racial inequality in America, white
evangelicals’ are distinctly individualist and anti-structuralist. Their argument is that
individualism is central to evangelical theology – evangelicals emphasize personal responsibility,
personal relationship with God, and personal salvation. This individualistic theological
foundation is, they argue, racially neutral 3 and has implications beyond the realm of faith and
spirituality; namely, it informs evangelicals’ racial attitudes and decisions about life in a
racialized society. They argue that even though American values (e.g., freedom, individualism,
etc.) shape the attitudes of all Americans, it is the fervor with which these beliefs are held by
evangelicals that makes them distinct. Emerson and Smith found white evangelicals to be more
likely to hold individualist beliefs about racial inequality (i.e., lack of motivation) and less likely
to hold structuralist beliefs (i.e., lack of educational opportunities and discrimination). Relying
in Swidler’s (1986) notion of culture as a tool kit, Emerson and Smith (2000) conclude that the
evangelical tool kit makes them distinctly individualist and anti-structuralist in their explanations
for racial inequality.
Studies following Emerson and Smith (2000) lend general support to their findings.
These studies have expanded on Emerson and Smith’s work in a number of ways. Hinojosa and

3

It is certainly arguable whether theology or cultural tools are racially neutral. Tranby and Hartmann (200?) found
evangelical cultural tools may not be as racially neutral as Emerson and Smith (2000) presume.
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Park (2004) attempted to identify whether other religious affiliations employ distinct cultural
tools by using Steensland and colleagues’ (2000) denominational scheme, comparing
evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Black Protestants, and those of other faiths to
non-affiliated individuals. They found that religion in general, as measured by religious
affiliation, “affects beliefs about inequality and exerts an independent effect” on answers to the
question about what explains racial inequality (235). In particular, evangelicals were found to be
more likely than the religiously non-affiliated to believe that a lack of motivation on the part of
African Americans explains their socioeconomic disadvantage. Mainline Protestants and
Catholics were less likely than the non-affiliated to offer the structural explanation of
discrimination, and Black Protestants were less likely than the non-affiliated to locate the cause
of inequality in the lack of educational opportunities. Thus, they conclude that “where religion is
significant, its effect is either to deny a structural cause…or to affirm the individualist
explanation” (235).
In contrast, Edgell and Tranby (2007) did not find evangelicals to be distinct in their view
of the causes of racial inequality, though they found Catholics to be more likely to hold
structuralist beliefs. They expanded previous research by looking at African American and
Hispanic religious traditions, finding Hispanic Catholics and African Americans who hold the
most orthodox beliefs to support structuralist explanations. They also found that structural
location (i.e., race and gender) and other religious factors (i.e., orthodoxy and involvement)
interact in important ways to produce different beliefs about racial inequality.
This study is an attempt to better understand the effect of religion on beliefs about racial
inequality. The literature on framing points to two important aspects that can build upon
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previous literature to create a better understanding of the effect of religion on beliefs about racial
inequality: first, that multiple frames are available and individuals can hold multiple, even
contradictory, frames simultaneously (Harding 2007), and second, that framing is a process that
can change over time (Small 2002). With regard to the first, this study will employ a
methodology that allows for a differentiation between those who hold purely individualist or
structuralist frames and those who combine individualist and structuralist frames to create
“mixed” frames. With regard to the second, this study will assess the ways that racial inequality
may be framed differently over time by religious groups by assessing changes over the last three
decades.
I offer two theoretically informed reasons for assessing the way that frames might change
over time. First, Schuman and colleagues (1997) have shown that as individuals and groups
experience or witness public events and “period influences” (e.g., the civil rights movement),
racial attitudes can, and in fact do, change over time. Hunt (2007) has shown an increasing trend
since the late 1970s toward support for the belief that lack of motivation and lack of educational
opportunities explain black-white inequality. Hunt also found a decrease in support for
discrimination as an explanation for inequality among racial and ethnic minorities. Hunt offers a
possible explanation for these shifts: the growth of the black middle class and the increased
number of black elected officials over the last three decades may “increase the perception of an
open opportunity-structure” (393), thereby increasing “blaming the victim” and decreasing
“system-blaming.”
In addition to this larger trend toward individualist frames, recent shifts in the American
religious landscape leave open the possibility that there may be changes over time. Hout and
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Fischer (2002) have identified a rather dramatic shift in the last two decades. Through the 1970s
and 1980s, the percentage of individuals who identified as “non-affiliated” remained rather
steady at around 7% of the population. However, with the onset of the 1990s, there was a
dramatic increase in the number of individuals who identified as being non-affiliated. From
1991 to 2000, the percentage of Americans identifying as non-affiliated doubled to 14%. Hout
and Fischer have argued that this shift does not point to secularization but instead to a
disassociation with organized religion. They have shown that those who left the institution of
religion were those who had weak attachments to religion and held moderate or liberal political
views. Their argument is that these individuals left religion in the 1990s during the rise of the
Religious Right, when conservative politics was fused with organized religion. Thus, it was not
that these individuals considered themselves non-spiritual, but rather that they left organized
religion because of a conservative political agenda. If political liberals and moderate fled
organized religion (and if these individuals also had more liberal racial attitudes), this could
mean that religious groups as a whole have become conservative in their views of racial
inequality over time.
Before beginning the analysis, I offer some background information on the different
religious traditions that will be included in this study. Hinojosa and Park (2004) have argued
that where religion is significant, it is either to support individualist explanations or to deny
structuralist explanations. I expect the same to be found in this study. That is, I do not expect
religious groups to be more structuralist than the non-affiliated, nor do I expect them to be less
individualist than the non-affiliated, whom Kellstedt and Green (1993) have argued are more
liberal than the religiously affiliated.
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Evangelicalism has been characterized as a religious subculture whose religious vitality
derives from their efforts to be distinguished from society (Smith 1998). As noted above,
research has shown them to be individualist and anti-structuralist in their explanations for racial
inequality (Emerson and Smith 2000; Hinojosa and Park 2004). It is expected that the same will
be found in this study.
Mainline Protestantism has a history of working toward socially progressive ends. Its
theology is rooted in the social gospel movement, which stood against the excesses of early 20th
century capitalism (Thuesen 2002). Mainline Protestants were also actively involved in the civil
rights movement, and denominational leaders within the mainline traditions continue to support
efforts to curb racial inequalities, though with perhaps less support presently than in the past
(Regnerus and Smith 1998; Verter 2002). Smith (1998) has argued that mainline Protestantism
is characterized by a “radical cultural accommodation” (Smith 1998:148) in which they have
engaged in the “intellectual, cultural, social, and political life of the nation” (Smith 1998:10).
Smith argues that their “lack of oppositional engagement in or tension with mainstream society”
(148) has stifled their religious vitality. While it may stifle their religious vigor, their larger
engagement with society may also mean that mainline Protestants may have racial attitudes
similar to those who identify as non-affiliated.
Catholicism has a theological tradition that emphasizes communalism and social justice.
It has a history of working against racial inequality, evidenced by their active engagement in the
civil rights movement (Wuthnow 1989) and support for social welfare in America (Kohut,
Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000). In support of this picture of American Catholicism, Hunt (2002)
found Catholics to be more likely to hold structuralist beliefs about poverty, while Edgell and
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Tranby (2007) found Catholics to be more likely to support structuralist explanations for racial
inequality. It may be that the Catholic emphasis on communalism, justice, and social welfare
contribute to framing racial inequality in ways similar to those who do not identify with a
religious tradition.
Judaism also has a history of social engagement. American Jews were an active presence
in the civil rights movement and have a historic association with the African American
community (Phillips 1991). In addition, scholars have argued that the Jewish status as a
historically oppressed minority gives them an “underdog status” and makes them more likely
than the dominant religious traditions (i.e., Protestantism and Catholicism) to be structuralist in
their views of social inequality (Hunt 2002). For these reasons, it may be that Jews will be
similar to the non-affiliated.
Black Protestants, while theologically conservative, may be more socially progressive
with regard to issues of race and racial inequality. They have been at the forefront of the fight
for civil rights and the alleviation of racial inequality in America (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990).
The Black Protestant religious tradition also de-emphasizes individualism while promoting a
communitarian ethic (Pattillo-McCoy 1998). It is expected that Black Protestants will be similar
to the non-affiliated. Given that previous research has shown racial and ethnic minorities to
combine individualist and structuralist explanations (Hughes and Tuch 2000; Hunt 2007), it is
possible that they will be more likely than the non-affiliated to do so.
There is also a category for those of other faiths. Because little can be said about this
group because it consists of so many different religious groups, no expectations are drawn.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS
This research project will utilize quantitative data analysis using the General Social
Survey (GSS) between 1985 and 2008 to assess the effect of religion on frames for racial
inequality. The General Social Survey (GSS) is conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC). It is a nationally representative, randomly sampled survey of noninstitutionalized adults administered annually from 1972 through 1994 and biennially since then.
Because some years do not include the questions relevant to this research project, the following
years will be used: 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006, and 2008.
Dependent Variables
The GSS has included the following question: “On the average, blacks have worse jobs,
income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are…
A. Mainly due to discrimination.
B. Because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn.
C. Because most blacks don’t have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of
poverty.
D. Because most blacks just don’t have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out
of poverty.”
Respondents answered either Yes or No to each of these four possible explanations. Following
previous research (Hunt 2007; Kluegel 1990; Schuman et al. 1997), responses of B (Ability) and
D (Motivation) are considered individualist explanations for racial inequality while responses of
A (Discrimination) and C (Education) are considered structuralist explanations for inequality.
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To date, research on the effect of religion on beliefs about racial inequality has simply
assessed whether respondents are more or less likely to give each response (Edgell and Tranby
2007; Emerson and Smith 2000; Hinojosa and Park 2004). While this has contributed to
understanding racial attitudes among the religious, this approach does not distinguish between
those who hold only individualist explanations (e.g., believing that racial inequality is caused
only by a lack of motivation), those who hold only structuralist explanations (e.g., those who
believe that discrimination explains racial inequality), and those who combine individualist and
structuralist explanations (e.g., believing that racial inequality is caused by a lack of motivation
as well as the existence of discrimination). Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelzle (1983) refer to
holding only one explanation for racial inequality as holding a “pure” mode (96) and holding
multiple explanations as holding a “mixed” mode (105). Making such a distinction between
“pure” and “mixed” modes is important because those who hold purely individualist modes are
less likely than both those employing mixed modes and those employing structuralist modes to
support structuralist solutions for racial inequality (Hunt 2007; Kluegel 1990).
In constructing frames for racial inequality, this study relies on Kluegel (1990), who
created seven “typologies” based on the patterns of responses that respondents could give in
answering Yes or No to the four different explanations for racial inequality. Kluegel’s
“typologies” are conceptualized in this study as “frames” for interpreting racial inequality. Thus,
there are four types of frames: individualist frames, structuralist frames, mixed frames, and the
“none” frame (See Table 1 for the patterns of responses). Each of the first three frames has two
subtypes. There are two individualist frames: the Ability frame and the Motivation frame. There
are two structuralist frames: the Education frame and the Discrimination frame. There are two
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mixed frames: the Ability + Structuralism frame and the Motivation + Structuralism frame. The
final frame is the referred to as the None frame.
I offer a brief description of these frames and how previous research has conceptualized
them. This preliminary overview will give a general sense about each of the frames being used
in this study and what they say about those who hold them.
The Ability frame refers to those who hold that racial inequality is the result of the innate
inferiority of African Americans. Kluegel (1990) refers to those in this category “traditional
individualists” (515), and Hunt (2007) calls them “traditional racists” (392). This frame points to
a traditional, biological form of racism.
Those employing the Motivation frame believe that “a lack of will or effort on the part of
blacks without an accompanying belief in innate inferiority” (392) explains racial inequality.
Kluegel (1990), finding that individuals in this group were in fact less traditionally prejudice
than those found in the Ability category, concluded that traditional racism and the belief that lack
of motivation explains racial inequality are distinct and independently held beliefs. Whereas the
Ability frame points to a traditional form of racism, the Motivation frame refers to “cultural
racism” that blames individuals for their own inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2006).
The Ability + Structuralism and Motivation + Structuralism frames are more likely to be
held by racial and ethnic minorities than by whites, suggesting a dual consciousness (Hughes and
Tuch 2000; Hunt 1996). Other than noting that minority groups are more likely to hold these
frames, little else has been offered in previous literature about the conceptualization of these
frames. It is also possible combining individualist and structuralist frames is a feature of
contemporary racial attitudes (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Kluegel 1990; Kluegel and Smith 1986)
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The Education frame has been held by those in the race and religion literature to be a
structuralist category (Edgell and Tranby 2007; Emerson and Smith 2000, Hinojosa and Park
2004). However, Kluegel (1990; see also Jackman and Muha 1984) has argued that citing a lack
of educational opportunities to explain racial inequality might
serve a particular function for privilege individuals who are also sensitive to racial
inequality. Adherents can recognize racial injustice without challenging the
legitimacy of the economic system from which the privilege derives. To see the
economic gap as a result of the failings of educational institutions alone is
consistent with the belief that economic institutions function fairly, permitting
those who acquire the necessary educational credentials to occupy privileged
positions if they work hard. (p.520)
Thus, it may be that the Education frame may function less like a structuralist frame.
The Discrimination frame holds that racial inequality is the result of discrimination
against African Americans. Those employing this frame are considered to hold a racially
progressive position about the causes of racial inequality.
Finally, the None “frame.” While not actually a “frame” because individuals fitting this
category may hold other beliefs about the causes of racial inequality, this frame is important to
include. Hunt (2007) found that those in this group tend to be white, from the South, and
politically conservative. Thus, this group appears to be a more conservative approach to
responding to questions about racial inequality.
Independent Variables
In order to assess whether religious affiliation increases or decreases the odds of holding
different frames for explaining black disadvantage, this research will utilize the religious
affiliation categorization created by Steensland and colleagues (2000). This denominational
scheme identifies seven categories of religious affiliation: evangelical Protestants, mainline
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Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Black Protestants, those of other faiths, and non-affiliated. This
scheme was created based on respondents’ answers to a GSS question about their religious
preference. They chose between the following affiliations: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, none, or
“other.” Those who claimed a Protestant affiliation were asked for the specific denomination
with which they affiliated. Steensland and colleagues then grouped together evangelicals
Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Black Protestants according to historical and theological
criteria for the different denominations that respondents provided.
By differentiating between evangelical, mainline, and Black Protestants, this
classification scheme improved upon previous attempts at classification (Glock and Stark 1965;
Roof and McKinney 1987; Smith 1990). Steensland and colleagues (2000) have argued that
mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants differ with regard to their stances toward
modernity, social and economic justice, and religious pluralism. They hold mainline Protestants
to have more accommodating stances toward modernity and religious pluralism and more liberal
attitudes toward issues of justice. They have argued that evangelicals are distinct in
differentiating themselves from wider culture and in their involvement with evangelism. Black
Protestants, in contrast with these predominantly white Protestant traditions, tend to emphasize
matters of freedom and justice, causing them to be more liberal on matters of poverty and
inequality. This classification scheme is also used in the most recent literature on racial attitudes
among the religious (Edgell and Tranby 2007; Hinojosa and Park 2004; Tranby and Hartmann
2008). In this study, the non-affiliated were treated as the reference group.
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Control Variables
Race, educational attainment, age, income, political orientation, gender, region, and type
of community (urban/rural) were controlled (Edgell and Tranby 2007; Emerson and Smith 2000;
Hinojosa and Park 2004; Hunt 2007). I also included variables to control for religious
participation (Edgell and Tranby 2007; Hinojosa and Park 2004) as well as religious orthodoxy
(Edgell and Tranby 2007), since increased levels of religious participation and more conservative
religious views have both been found to predict conservative racial attitudes.
Creating the race control variable involved a coding scheme that differentiates between
non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics, and African Americans. The GSS RACE variable was recoded
for white (1), black (2) and other (3). I then used the GSS ETHNIC variable to classify those
from Mexico, Puerto Rico, Spain, and other Spanish countries as Hispanic. Those who were
non-Hispanic black were recoded as 1, Hispanic as 1, and non-Hispanic white as 0. The SEX
variable was recoded into Male (1) and Female (0). Four categories were created for education
using the DEGREE variable. Less than High School (0) served as the comparison group for
High School (1), College (1), and Beyond College (1). Southern residents were identified by
recoding the REGION variable, designating those from the East South Central and West South
Central as being from the South. These individuals were recoded as South (1) and others from
non-South (0). For type of community, the XNORCSIZ variable was recoded by coding those
outside of SMSA as Rural (1) and the rest as Urban (0). The religious orthodoxy variable
recoded the BIBLE variable. Those who believed that the Bible is “the actual word of God and
is to be taken literally” were recoded 1 and those who believed the Bible is not to be taken
literally or is an ancient book were recoded as 0. AGE and INCOME were treated as continuous
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variables, with higher number corresponding to being older (1-8) and having higher levels of
income (1-12). The ATTEND variable was treated as continuous, with the higher values (0-8)
corresponding to more religious service attendance. The POLVIEWS variable was also treated
as continuous, 1 being extremely liberal and 5 being extremely conservative. Finally year of
survey was also controlled for, treated as a continuous variable. Fourteen years were included:
1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYTIC STRATEGY
There were two general approaches for the analyses in this project. The first approach
involved the inclusion of all years in which the variables were available, 1985 to 2008. The
second approach involved grouping years together in order to assess changes in the odds ratios
across decades. These grouping are as follows: 1985-1993, 1994-2000, and 2002-2008, and they
will be referred to as the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, respectively. It is recognized that the
monikers for these years does not match the years that are included in each grouping. The years
were included together to ensure large enough sample sizes for analyzing trends across time, and
the names used for these groups were chosen for ease of reference throughout the study. While it
would have been preferable to include only years from the 1980s in the first grouping, the
sample sizes were not conducive. It must also be recognized that using decade markers (e.g.,
1980-1989) is itself arbitrary and most often a matter of convenience and ease of reference.
The first two analyses involved running cross tabulation in order to provide both the
overall percentage of individuals within each denomination employing each frame for racial
inequality (Table 2) and to map out general trends of the percentage of individuals in each
denominational affiliation that hold each of the seven frames (Table 3). The by-decade
preliminary analysis used the decade groupings to map out these trends. Percentages for both of
these cross tabulations were arrived at by dividing the number of individuals within each
denomination whose responses correspond to each frame by the total number of respondents for
that denomination, both overall and by decade. For example, from 1985-1993, there were 456
evangelicals whose responses corresponded to the Motivation frame. In that same time period,
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there were 1168 evangelical respondents, for a total of 39.0% of evangelicals employing the
Motivation frame in the 1980s.
The second analysis involved a binary logistic regression that included all years in which
the variables are available, 1985-2008 (Table 4). This analysis involved running seven different
models, one for each frame for racial inequality. For example, a model was run for the Ability
frame. The non-affiliated served as the reference group, and the inclusion of the controls
allowed for an assessment of increased or decreased odds of each religious affiliation employing
the Ability frame. Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholic, Black Protestants, Jewish, and
those of other faiths were included, and the non-affiliated were the reference group. The same
was done for the Motivation frame, the Education frame, the Discrimination frame, both mixed
frames, and the None frame.
The third analysis is similar to the second. It involved binary logistic regression for each
of the frames for racial inequality (Tables 5-10). The difference is that three different models
were run for each frame, one for each decade. This made it possible to assess any ways that
religious groups are changing in their employment of these seven frames over time. In order to
assess change over time, regression difference t-tests were conducted, comparing the parameter
estimates across time. 4 Thus, differences were assessed between the 1980s and 1990s, 1990s
and 2000s, as well as the 1980s and 2000s. The regression difference t-test is a way to assess if
differences between the regression coefficients are statistically significant (Knoke, Bohrnstedt
and Mee 2002).

4

The formula for the regression difference t-test is:

(b1 − b 2)
se12 + se2 2
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Due to insufficient sample sizes, this study does not include binary logistic analyses by
decade for the Ability frame. However, I did include the descriptive results as well as the binary
logistic regression in which all years were included to provide some general sense of how
religion informs this frame.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis of Trends
Table 2 (see Appendix: Tables for all data outputs) displays preliminary results for the
whole sample, providing the percentage of individuals in each denomination who employ each
frame. The Ability frame finds rather small levels of support. Evangelicals had the highest
percentage of individuals holding this frame (8.1%). No other denomination was over 7%.
Jews had the smallest percentage (2.3%), followed by the non-affiliated (3.1%), those of other
faiths (3.5%), and Black Protestants (4.0%). Mainline Protestants (6.9%) and Catholics (6.5%)
came in just under evangelicals.
Evangelicals had the highest percentage of individuals who believed that lack of
motivation explains racial inequality (29.8%). As with the Ability frame, Mainline Protestants
(22.1%) and Catholics (21.3%) had the next highest percentage of individuals holding the
Motivation frame. Also similar to the Ability frame, Jews had the lowest percentage of
individuals (13.3%). They were followed by those of other faiths (16.1%), Black Protestants
(16.2%), and the non-affiliated (18.4%).
While the individualist frames consistently found evangelicals to have the highest
percentage of individuals and Jews the lowest percentage of individuals holding individualist
frames, a different pattern arises for the mixed frames. The non-affiliated had the smallest
percentages for both the Ability + Structuralism frame (5.2%) and the Motivation +
Structuralism frame (16.1%). Black Protestants had the highest percentage of individuals
believing that lack of ability combined with structuralist causes explained racial inequality
(9.8%), followed by Catholics (8.9%), Jews (8.7%), mainline Protestants (7.9%), evangelicals
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(7.5%), and those of other faiths (6.6%). With regard to those who combined lack of motivation
with structuralist explanations, those of other faiths had the highest percentage of individuals
(20.4%). Catholics (19.9%), mainline Protestants (19.3%), and Black Protestants (19.1%) were
all within about one percentage point of those of other faiths. Jews (18.6%), evangelicals
(18.2%), and the non-affiliated (16.1%) had the lowest percentage of individuals holding the
Motivation + Structuralism frame.
The structuralist Education frame had the highest level of support among Jews (16.5%)
and the non-affiliated (13.5%). Evangelicals (7.9%) showed the lowest level of support. Black
Protestants (8.6%) were the only other group with less than 10% of adherents utilizing this
frame. Catholics (10.9%), those of other faiths (11.1%), and mainline Protestants (12.4%) fell in
the middle.
The Discrimination frame found high levels of support among the non-affiliated (32.4%),
those of other faiths (31.9%), Black Protestants (31.9%), and Jews (31.0%). The other
denominations had considerably lower percentages. Evangelicals had the lowest percentage of
individuals citing discrimination as an explanation for black-white inequality at 17.3%.
Catholics (21.2%) and mainline Protestants (22.3%) had slightly higher percentages than
evangelicals.
Those who believed that none of these causes explained racial inequality found higher
levels of support among the non-affiliated (11.3%), evangelicals (11.2%), and Catholics (11.1%).
Black Protestants (10.4%) and those of other faiths (10.4%) fell in the middle, while mainline
Protestants (9.1%) and Jews (9.6%) had the smallest percentages of individuals who believed
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that none of the possible explanations for racial inequality adequately described the persistence
of racial inequality.
Table 3 displays preliminary results for each denomination by decade, along with the
differences over time (∆ term). This preliminary analysis will provide broad trends over time
that will be further analyzed using binary logistic regression. The Ability frame was found to a
decline across nearly all religious affiliations. The largest decline was found among
evangelicals, a decline of two-thirds. This may be expected given that they also had the highest
percentage of individuals employing the Ability frame in the 1980s. Catholics and Black
Protestants have the highest percentage of individuals employing this frame (5.4%) in the recent
decade. There were two surprising trends. First, while all groups showed a decline in the
percentage of individuals employing the Ability frame, Black Protestants showed an increase of
over more than double. Second, evangelicals were found to have a smaller percentage of
individuals employing this frame in the 2000s than mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Black
Protestants. This is interesting given that evangelicals are generally held to be the most
conservative of American religious groups.
The other individualist frame, the Motivation frame, saw an increase in almost every
religious affiliation with the exception of those of Jewish faith, who showed an inconsistent
pattern. Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics all showed increases of around 25%.
The non-affiliated showed an increase of around 50%, second in this frame only to Black
Protestants, who showed a dramatic increase of over 250%, increasing from 6.6% to 25.1%.
Evangelicals had the highest percentage of individuals utilizing this frame (32.8%) in the most
recent decade, followed by mainline Protestants (24.9%), Catholics (24.0%), and Black
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Protestants (24.0%). The smallest percentage was found among Jews, with only 13.1%
employing the Motivation frame.
Table 2 also shows a decrease across nearly all religious affiliations in the percentage of
individuals who combine individualist and structuralist frames. The Ability + Structuralism
frame fell below 10% for each group in the 2000s, the lowest percentages among all the frames
with the exception of the Ability frame. Catholics, Black Protestants, and Jews had the highest
percentage in the 2000s, all of which had just over 8% of individuals using this frame.
Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, the non-affiliated, and those of other faiths all had under 6%
of individuals that employ this frame. Evangelicals (46.8%), mainline Protestants (50.6%),
Black Protestants (48.2%) and those other faiths (44.2%) showed the largest declines.
With regard to the Motivation + Structuralism frame, all groups saw a decline in the
percentage of individuals utilizing this frame. Black Protestants were found to exhibit relative
consistency, with around 19% of Black Protestants employing this frame in each of the three
decades. The non-affiliated showed the largest decline, falling from 23.8% to 12.3%, a decline
of nearly 50%. Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics all had declines, with
percentages falling from just over 20% of each of their adherents in the 1980s to 17.2%, 16.2%,
and 18.6%, respectively, in the 2000s.
The Education frame was found to show increases in nearly every denominational
category. Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics all had considerable increases over
time, 56.5%, 35.8%, and 22.7%, respectively. Black Protestants saw an increase of nearly oneand-one-half times, from under 5% to just over 12%. The non-affiliated and mainline Protestants
had the highest percentages in the 2000s (14.8%) and evangelicals the lowest (9.8%). Though
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nearly all groups saw a decline in the number of individuals employing the Discrimination
frame, this frame showed perhaps the most consistency across time. Evangelicals (8.4%),
mainline Protestants (8.5%), and the non-affiliated (9.0%) all had modest declines, while Black
Protestants showed a substantial decline of 63.3%, from 47.6% to 17.5%.
Those who answered No to each of the four possible responses to the question about
explanations for racial inequality increased considerably for each group. Black Protestants saw
the largest increase at over 300%, followed by those of other faith at over 200%. All other
groups with the exception of Jews more than doubled.
Overall, the trend among religious groups is toward individualist frames, away from
frames combining individualist and structuralist frames, toward the structuralist frame of
Education, away from the structuralist frame of Discrimination, and toward the belief that none
of these frames explain racial inequality.
Evangelicals consistently showed a conservative position on beliefs about racial
inequality, having the highest percentage of individuals holding the Motivation frame in the
2000s, the lowest holding the Ability + Structuralism frame, the lowest employing the Education
frame, the lowest holding the Discrimination frame, and the highest percentage holding the None
frame.
Jews were found to hold some of the more racially progressive positions with the lowest
percentage of individuals employing the Motivation frame, the second highest percentage
holding the Education frame, the highest percentage employing the Discrimination frame, and
the lowest percentage believing that none of these frames explain racial inequality.
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Black Protestants consistently showed the largest increases or decreases, and nearly
always in a more conservative direction. They were found to have the largest increase in the
Ability and Motivation frames, as well as the largest increase of individuals employing the None
frame. They also showed the largest increase in employment of the Education frame and the
largest decrease in the use of the Discrimination frame.
Religious Affiliation and Frames for Racial Inequality
Table 4 shows the parameter estimates and odds ratios for seven models (one for each
frame for racial inequality), with all years included in the analysis. Several denominations were
found to have increased likelihood of interpreting racial inequality as the result of a lack of
ability among African Americans (Model 1). Evangelicals were 1.676 times more likely,
mainline Protestants 1.647 times more likely, and Catholics 1.860 times more likely than the
non-affiliated to employ the Ability frame. Black Protestants, Jews, and those of other faiths
were not found to be any different than the non-affiliated. Many of the expected control
variables were found to be determinants of the Ability frame: older respondents, those adhering
to a conservative political ideology, males, those living in the South, whites, those who believed
that the Bible is the inspired Word of God, and those with less than high school education all
showed increased odds of employing the Ability frame compared to younger individuals,
political liberals, females, those living outside the South, non-whites, those with more liberal
views of the Bible, and those with educational attainment levels of high school and beyond.
Perhaps unexpectedly, increased religious service attendance was found to decrease the odds of
employing this frame. In addition, the statistical significance and the negative slope of the year
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variable confirmed the general trend away from the use of this frame identified in the descriptive
analysis.
Four religious groups were found to have increased odds of employing the Motivation
frame (Table 4, Model 2). Evangelicals were 1.768 times more likely than the non-affiliated to
believe that lack of motivation explains racial inequality, followed by Black Protestants (1.753),
mainline Protestants (1.468), and Catholics (1.458). Jews and those of other faith were no
different from the non-affiliated. Similar to the Ability frame, the controls reflect the
conservative nature of this frame. Younger individuals, those with a college degree or more,
African Americans, and Hispanics all showed increased likelihood of employing this frame
compared with those who were older, those with less than high school education, and whites.
Those with higher income, those holding conservative political ideologies, men, and those living
in rural areas as well as the South were all more likely to cite lack of motivation compared with
those with lower income, political liberals, women, and those living in urban areas or regions
outside of the South. Again, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, increased religious service
attendance was found to decrease the likelihood of employing the Motivation frame. Beliefs
about the Bible were not significant. The positive and significant year variable confirmed the
overall trend in the descriptive analysis toward an increase in interpreting black socioeconomic
disadvantage as matter of lack of will on the part of African Americans.
Moving from the individualist frames to the mixed frames, the regression analyses
identified adherents of the Jewish faith as having increased odds of employing both the Ability +
Structuralism frame (Table 4, Model 3) and the Motivation + Structuralism frame (Table 4,
Model 4). Jews were 1.752 times more likely than the non-affiliated to hold the Ability +
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Structuralism frame and 1.446 times more likely to hold the Motivation + Structuralism frame.
No other religious groups were statistically significant for either of these models. The
demographic variables reveal that the Ability + Structuralism frame is a rather conservative
frame. Older individuals showed an increased likelihood of holding this frame compared to
younger respondents; those with less than high school education were more likely than high
school graduates, college graduates, and those with education beyond college; those with lower
levels of income were more likely than those with higher income; Hispanics were more likely
than whites to combine a lack of inborn ability with structuralist explanations to explain racial
inequality. Both religious control variables were significant. Those with less church attendance
and those who believe that the Bible is the inspired Word of God had increased odds of
employing this frame. The significant and negative slope of the year variable also confirmed the
downward trend of the use of this frame in the descriptive analysis.
With regard to the Motivation + Structuralism frame, those with a high school education,
political conservatives, African Americans, and Hispanics all showed increased odds of
employing this frame compared to those with less than high school education, political liberals,
and whites. Religious service attendance was not significant, but religious orthodoxy was.
Those with a more liberal view of the Bible were more likely to believe that lack of motivation
along with a structuralist explanation explains black-white inequality. The negative and
significant trend variable pointed to a decrease in the employment of this frame over time, which
is consistent with the trends in the descriptive analysis.
Religion was found to do relatively little to decrease the odds of individuals believing
that a lack of education alone explains racial inequality (Table 4, Model 5). The only group
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significantly less likely than the non-affiliated to employ this frame was evangelicals, who were
.783 times less likely to do so. The control variables reveal an interesting picture. Some of the
controls that were found to be significant suggest that the Education frame is a structuralist
frame. Younger individuals were more likely than older respondents to employ this frame; so
too were those with high school education or above compared to those with less than high school
education. Those with more liberal views of the Bible were more likely to cite a lack of
educational opportunities compared to those who believe the Bible is the inspired Word of God.
Residency also decreased the chances of employing this frame, with those living in rural areas
being less likely than those living outside of rural areas. Whites were more likely than blacks
and Hispanics to hold the Education frame, as were those with higher income more likely than
those with lower income. It seems, then, that being toward the top of the socioeconomic and
racial stratifications increases the odds of interpreting racial inequality as a matter of lack of
education. In addition to these findings and similar to the overall trend identified in the
descriptive analysis, the significant and positive trend variable points to an overall increase in the
employment of the Education frame.
Several religious affiliations were less likely than the non-affiliated to hold the belief that
persistent discrimination explains racial inequality (Table 4, Model 6). Evangelicals, mainline
Protestants, and Catholics were all less likely than the non-affiliated to hold this frame, .686,
.749, and .662 times less likely, respectively. The control variables also point to this frame as a
racially progressive interpretation of racial inequality. Those who were not married were more
likely than those who were married to cite discrimination as an explanation for black
socioeconomic disadvantage. Those with levels of education high school or beyond were more
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likely than those with less than high school education to use the Discrimination frame. Political
liberals, females, and those living outside of the South showed an increased likelihood of
employing this frame compared to political conservatives, males, and those dwelling in the
South. Finally, Hispanics and African Americans were more likely than whites to cite
discrimination as an explanation for racial inequality. Those who did not believe that the Bible
is the literal Word of God were also significantly more likely to employ the Discrimination
frame than those who believe in the inspiration of the Bible. An unexpected pattern continues, as
those with higher levels of religious service attendance were more likely than those who attend
less to see racial inequality as a matter of discrimination. The trend variable was not significant,
suggesting relative stability for this frame.
The final frame—the belief that none of these frames explain racial inequality—found no
support amongst the religiously affiliated (Table 4, Model 7). Consistent with previous research,
it appears that this view of racial inequality leans toward a conservative position, as those who
were married, younger, politically conservative, and those in the South were more likely to
employ this frame than the unmarried, older respondents, political liberals, and those outside the
South. African Americans were significantly less likely than whites to do so. Finally, consistent
with the descriptive analysis, the trend variable was positive and significant, pointing to an
increase in the employment of this frame over time.
Having looked at the findings for the whole sample, I turn to the results by decade in
order to assess any changes in the use of frames over time. Tables 5-10 provide the binary
logistic regression results for the frames for racial inequality by decade. In order to determine
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significant change across time in the use of each frame for racial inequality, regression difference
t-tests 5 were conducted, comparing the parameter estimates across each decade.
Table 5 shows the results of the logistic regression by decade for the Motivation frame.
Evangelicals and Catholics were more likely than the non-affiliated to utilize the Motivation
frame to explain racial inequality in all three decades. Evangelicals were 2.440 times more
likely than the non-affiliated to do so in the 1980s, 1.563 times more likely in the 1990s, and
1.525 more likely in the 2000s. The independent t-tests found that over time the difference
between evangelicals and the non-affiliated was declining. There was a significant decline in
difference between evangelicals and the non-affiliated from the 1980s to the 1990s (t=1.948) as
well as from the 1980s to the 2000s (t=2.052). This suggests that these two groups are becoming
more alike over time.
Catholics were found to show a similar pattern. They were 1.920 times more likely than
the non-affiliated to employ the Motivation frame in the 1980s, 1.295 times more likely in the
1990s, and 1.322 times more likely in the 2000s. The differences between Catholics and the
non-affiliated in the 1980s declined significantly in the 1990s (t=1.738). It appears that this
significant decline in difference persisted through the 1990s such that the difference between
Catholics and the non-affiliated declined from the 1980s to the 2000s (t=1.645). Like
evangelicals, it appears that the difference between Catholics and the non-affiliated is declining
over time.
Mainline Protestants were 1.787 times more likely than the non-affiliated to employ the
Motivation frame in the 1980s and 1.436 times more likely in the 1990s, but they were no more
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See Chapter 4: Analytic Strategy for details.
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likely to do so in the 2000s. They showed no significant change between the 1980s and 1990s or
the 1990s and 2000s. The difference between the 1980s and 2000s only neared significance
(t=1.418). While not significant, this may point to a trend toward similarity with the nonaffiliated. Black Protestants showed increased odds of holding the Motivation frame in the
1980s and 2000s, 2.160 and 2.035 times more likely than the non-affiliated, respectively;
however, they were no different in the 1990s, and the differences between decades never reached
statistical significance. Neither Jews nor those of other religions were any more or less likely
than the non-affiliated to utilize the Motivation frame to explain racial inequality.
This provides a more complete picture than the results of the overall regression, which
found evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Black Protestants to be more likely than
the non-affiliated to employ this frame. Evangelicals and Catholics showed a clear trend toward
similarity with the non-affiliated, though they were both still significantly more likely to hold
this frame in the 2000s. Mainline Protestants were not found to show a statistically significant
trend toward similarity with the non-affiliated, but the difference did reach near statistical
significance, suggesting a trend toward similarity. These findings for evangelicals, Catholics,
and mainline Protestants point to a general trend toward a decline in difference between these
affiliations and the non-affiliated.
The overall regression results for both mixed frames showed that those of the Jewish faith
were more likely than the non-affiliated to employ both the Ability + Structuralism frame and the
Motivation + Structuralism frame. However, when the models were run by decade, a different
picture arises. None of the denominations were more or less likely than the non-affiliated to
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employ the Ability + Structuralism frame (see Table 6) in any decade, and there were no
significant trends across any of the decades.
The Motivation + Structuralism frame (Table 7) revealed a very different pattern. In the
1980s, none of the denominational affiliations were more or less likely than the non-affiliated to
interpret racial inequality as a combination of lack of motivation and structuralist explanations.
The same was the case for the 1990s. By the 2000s, evangelicals, mainline Protestants,
Catholics, and Jews were all more likely than the non-affiliated to hold this view. In the 2000s,
evangelicals were 1.601 times more likely than the non-affiliated to combine lack of motivation
with structuralist explanation. They also showed a significant change in the parameter estimates
from the 1990s to 2000s (t=-1.879) and from the 1980s to 2000s (t=-3.204). This points to a
growing difference between evangelicals and the non-affiliated over time. In addition, mainline
Protestants and Catholics were also more likely than the non-affiliated to employ the Motivation
+ Structuralism frame in the 2000s, being 1.558 and 1.658 times more likely, respectively. The
difference between Mainline Protestants and the non-affiliated (t=-1.917) as well as the
difference between Catholics and the non-affiliated (t=-2.300) increased from the 1980s to the
1990s. These differences from the 1980s to the 1990s were sustained for both groups through
the 2000s, resulting in an overall increase in difference between Mainline Protestants and the
non-affiliated (t=-3.022) and Catholics and the non-affiliated (t=-3.641) from the 1980s to the
2000s.
Different, yet still significant, changes were found for Black Protestants and Jews. Black
Protestants, while not being more or less likely than the non-affiliated to employ the Motivation
+ Structuralism frame in any decade, showed a significant change from the 1980s to the 2000s
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(t=-2.088). Thus, it appears that the difference between Black Protestants and the non-affiliated
is increasing over time. Adherents of the Jewish faith were 2.243 times more likely than the
non-affiliated to employ the Motivation + Structuralism frame in the 2000s after being no more
or less likely to do so in the 1980s or 1990s. Jews showed a significant change across time,
becoming less like the non-affiliated from the 1990s to the 2000s (t=-1.707).
Whereas the Motivation frame showed some level of convergence over time between the
non-affiliated and their evangelical, mainline Protestant, and Catholic counterparts, a trend of
divergence was found for the Motivation + Structuralism frame. Five religious groups—
evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholics, Black Protestants, and Jews—appear to be
becoming less like the non-affiliated over time.
Turning to the structuralist frames, Table 8 provides the results of the binary logistic
regression by decade for the Education frame. While evangelicals were less likely than the nonaffiliated to employ the Education frame in the analysis that included all years, the analysis by
decade showed a different pattern. With the exception of evangelicals being .602 times less
likely to employ this frame in the 1980s, no other religious affiliations were found to be more or
less likely than the non-affiliated to interpret racial inequality as the result of a lack of
educational opportunity. Evangelicals, less likely to hold this frame in the 1980s, were not found
to exhibit a significant change over time.
The other structuralist frame, the Discrimination frame (see Table 9), showed an even
different pattern than was found in the Motivation and Motivation + Structuralism frames.
While the Motivation frame pointed to a convergence between some of the affiliated and nonaffiliated and the Motivation + Structuralism frame showed a divergence between most of the

37

religiously affiliated and the non-affiliated, the Discrimination frame showed some stability and
some change. In the overall analysis, evangelicals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics were all
less likely than the non-affiliated to interpret racial inequality as a matter of discrimination; yet,
in the analysis by decade, only evangelicals and Catholics were less likely to believe that
discrimination causes racial inequality in all three decades. Evangelicals were .696 times less
likely than the non-affiliated in the 1980s to cite discrimination as an explanation for black
socioeconomic disadvantage, .611 times less likely in the 1990s, and .644 times less likely in the
2000s. Similarly, Catholics were .743 times less likely than the non-affiliated in the 1980s to
hold the Discrimination frame, .580 times less likely in the 1990s, and .580 times less likely in
the 2000s. Independent t-tests found no changes across time in the parameter estimates for either
group, suggesting stability across time for evangelicals and Catholics.
Mainline Protestants and Jews both showed an interesting pattern. Both of these groups
were no different from the non-affiliated in the 1980s and 2000s, yet mainline Protestants were
.608 times less likely and Jews .614 times less likely than the non-affiliated to believe
discrimination explains racial inequality in the 1990s. While an independent t-test showed only
near statistically significant increase in difference from the 1980s to the 1990s between Jews and
the non-affiliated (t=1.459), there was a statistically significant change from the 1990s to the
2000s (t=-1.653), with the difference between Jews and the non-affilaited significantly
decreasing to non-significance in the 2000s. Thus, from the 1990s to the 2000s, Jews went from
being less likely than the non-affiliated to employ this frame to being no less likely, with the
change being statistically significant. The independent t-tests for mainline Protestants showed
only near statistically significant decrease in similarity from the 1980s to 1990s (t=1.393) and
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near statistically significanc increase in similarity from the 1990s to 2000s (t=-1.477). Thus, it
appears that there is a sort of conservative “dip” in the 1990s for Mainline Protestants and Jews.
The final analysis, the None frame, shown in Table 10, supports the findings in the
overall analysis. Religious affiliation was not found to increase or decrease the odds of believing
that none of the possible explanations in the survey question explain racial inequality.

39

CONCLUSIONS
This project began with two purposes, both of which were informed by the sociology of
culture literature. The first was to reassess the impact of religion by utilizing a methodology that
would differentiate between those who interpret racial inequality in purely individualist or
structuralist ways and those who combine individualist and structuralist explanations. The
second was to determine if the frames for interpreting racial inequality exhibit any changes
across time for religious groups. From the findings above, three broad conclusions are drawn.
First, religion continues to play a role in shaping what individuals believe about the causes of
black socioeconomic disadvantage. Second, distinguishing between pure frames and mixed
frames is important for understanding the role that religion plays in shaping the frames through
which individuals interpret racial inequality because it allows for a more precise measure of
racial attitudes. Third, the frames that religious groups employ have changed over time when
compared to the religiously non-affiliated. Each of these conclusions will now be looked at in
more detail.
Attention is first drawn to the first two conclusions. The findings of this study show that
it is important to distinguish between those who employ purely individualist and purely
structuralist frames for explaining racial inequality and those who employ mixed frames.
Utilizing a methodology that makes such a distinction allows for a more precise measure of
racial attitudes and appears to lead to different findings than previous research offers (Edgell and
Tranby 2007; Hinojosa and Park 2004). To show the unique findings of this study and to
highlight the current state of racial attitudes among the religious, attention is drawn to the
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differences between the findings in this study in the most recent decade (i.e., 2000s) and the
findings of the other studies. 6
The findings of this study differ in some important ways from the findings of previous
work by Hinojosa and Park (2004) and Edgell and Tranby (2007), both of which seek to move
beyond evangelicalism to understand the role of religion in shaping beliefs about racial
inequality. Particular attention should be paid to the study by Hinojosa and Park (2004), given
that their study and this present study utilize the same data set (GSS), the same denominational
scheme, the same comparison group, and many of the same control variables. Hinojosa and Park
(2004) found only evangelicals to be more likely than the non-affiliated to cite lack of motivation
as an explanation for racial inequality, and Edgell and Tranby (2007) found neither Catholics nor
evangelicals 7 to be more likely than non-Catholics and non-evangelicals to cite lack of
motivation. By comparison, this study found evangelicals, Catholics, and Black Protestants to be
more likely than the non-affiliated to employ the pure Motivation frame in the most recent
decade.
Differences were also found between this study and the findings of Hinojosa and Park
(2004) and Edgell and Tranby (2007) with regard to the structuralist explanations. Hinojosa and
Park (2004) found mainline Protestants and Catholics to be less likely than the non-affiliated to
offer the structural explanation of discrimination, while Edgell and Tranby (2007) found
Catholics to be more likely than non-evangelicals/non-Catholics to offer discrimination as an
explanation for black socioeconomic disadvantage, In contrast, this study found both
6

Hinojosa and Park (2004) utilized GSS data from 1996; thus, it might be appropriate to compare their findings to
the findings from the 1990s in this study. However, using findings from the 1990s would lead to the same
conclusions about the importance of distinguishing between pure and mixed frames.
7
Edgell and Tranby (2007) use the term “conservative Protestants.”
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evangelicals and Catholics to be less likely than the non-affiliated to cite discrimination alone as
an explanation for racial inequality in the 2000s. With regard to the belief that lack of education
explains racial inequality, Hinojosa and Park (2004) found Black Protestants to be less likely
than the non-affiliated to locate the cause of racial inequality in the lack of educational
opportunities. This study found no increased or decreased odds in the most recent decade that
the religiously affiliated would hold the Education frame.
Perhaps the most significant finding from this study—and one the shows the importance
of differentiating between pure frames and mixed frames—is that evangelicals, mainline
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews were found to be more likely than the non-affiliated to combine
the individualist Motivation frame with a structuralist frame in the 2000s. While other
conclusions may be drawn as to why the findings of this study differ from that of previous work,
it is the opinion of this author that these findings highlight the importance of differentiating
between those who hold purely individualist and structuralist frames from those who combine
individualist and structuralist frames. It appears that looking only at whether individuals answer
Yes or No to the possible explanations for racial inequality provides different findings than does
using a more precise measure that identifies those who combine individualist and structuralist
explanations.
Turning now to the trends over time, Small (2002) has argued that framing is a process
that requires “reinforcement mechanisms” because the contents of frames “are bound to change
as individuals’ and collectivities’ lives change” (37). While identifying specific mechanisms is
beyond the scope of this project, theoretically informed possibilities are provided. To begin, it is
interesting that the frames that showed significant findings were found to show different patterns
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of change across time. The Motivation frame suggests some level of convergence with the nonaffiliated, the Motivation + Structuralism frame showed divergence from the non-affiliated, and
the Discrimination frame showed two patterns, one pointing to stability over time and one
suggesting unique changes in the 1990s. Thus, in terms of identifying trends, changes seem to
depend on the specific frame for racial inequality.
The Motivation frame showed a general trend of convergence, with the likelihood that
religious affiliation produces this individualist frame diminishing over time. Evangelicals and
Catholics appear to be becoming significantly more like the non-affiliated over time, and
mainline Protestants may be trending in that direction as well. Black Protestants, with the
exception of being not significant in the 1990s, continue to be significantly more likely to be
motivational individualists. It should be noted, however, that while becoming less likely to
employ the Motivation frame over time, evangelicals and Catholics are still significantly more
likely to do so. Whether this trend will continue to the point that evangelicals and Catholics will
be no different than the non-affiliated requires research in the future.
One possible explanation for this trend in the Motivation frame relies on the findings of
Hunt (2007), who identified an increasing trend toward individualist explanations. The fact that
there appears to be some level of convergence from the 1980s to the 2000s suggests that those
holding the belief that lack of motivation explains racial inequality are becoming more evenly
distributed between the affiliated and the non-affiliated. Perhaps as time passes and African
Americans become a larger part of the middle class and play a more visible role in politics (Hunt
2007), any differences between the non-affiliated and the affiliated are diminishing due to more
conservative shifts among the non-affiliated. Whatever the explanation, it may be that this
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conservative frame for explaining racial inequality may no longer be a product of socialization
into religious groups in the future.
Whereas the Motivation frame suggests a convergence over time, the Motivation +
Structuralism frame showed a divergence, as nearly every religious affiliation (with the
exception of those of other faiths) has become more likely than the non-affiliated to employ this
frame over time. One of the difficulties with this frame is that it is a bit difficult to categorize.
Whereas the Motivation frame is a conservative frame and the Discrimination frame is a
progressive frame, this frame is less easily characterized. Previous research has identified this
frame as a product of the racial and ethnic minority experience. It has been argued that their
minority status allows them to recognize structural disadvantage, yet they also believe that
through individual effort structural barriers can be overcome (Hughes and Tuch 2000; Hunt
2007). This does not explain why these religious affiliations would be more likely to employ
this frame. It could be that combining the belief that lack of motivation with structuralist
explanations is a contemporary way for religious individuals to express some level of sensitivity
toward factors outside of the individual while also holding African Americans responsible for
any disadvantage they experience. This could correspond to the belief among some scholars that
ambivalence is a hallmark of contemporary racial attitudes (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Kluegel and
Smith 1986). It may also be that, for whatever reason, the non-affiliated are particularly more
likely to abandon the mixed frames over time for the more polarized purely individualist and
purely structuralist frames.
The Education frame is worth drawing attention despite the fact that there were largely no
significant findings. That no religious affiliation was found to predict this frame in any decade,
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with the exception of evangelicals in the 1980s, is rather interesting given a) that this has largely
been held to be a structuralist frame and b) evangelicals and Catholics were consistently less
likely to hold the other structuralist frame in all three decades (and Jews and mainline Protestants
were less likely to do so in the 1990s). Why was it that even the most racially conservative
religious groups were no different than the more racially progressive? Perhaps it is as Kluegel
(1990) has stated, that this frame represents a contemporary form of sensitivity to racial
inequality. Individuals can “recognize racial injustice without challenging the legitimacy of the
economic system from which the privilege derives” (520). They do this by believing that lack of
education serves as a barrier to socioeconomic success, but if this barrier were removed—and
because they do not believe discrimination to be a factor—African Americans would be able to
improve their socioeconomic standing.
The Discrimination frame reveals yet another pattern. Evangelicals and Catholics were
consistently more likely than the non-affiliated across all three decades to hold this frame, and
there were no significant changes over time. Mainline Protestants, being no different in the
1980s or 2000s while being less likely to hold this frame in the 1990s, showed near-significant
increase in difference compared to the non-affiliated from the 1980s to 1990s and near
significant decrease in difference from the 1990s to 2000s. Jews showed the same pattern,
though showed a significant decline in difference from the 1990s to 2000s, becoming more like
the non-affiliated in the 2000s after being significantly less likely to hold the Discrimination
frame in the 1990s. This “dip” from being as racially progressive as the non-affilaited in the
1980s, more conservative in the 1990s, and as progressive in the 2000s might be expected if, as
Hout and Fischer (2002) have argued, some liberals and moderates fled organized religion in the
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1990s. If this explains the dip in the 1990s, this does not explain why there would be a return to
non-significance in the 2000s, though it does raises questions about whether the flight from
religious affiliation in the 1990s played a role in this shift in racial attitudes.
This project began as a reassessment of the racial attitudes of the religiously affiliated. A
more precise measure of racial attitudes was employed, and an assessment was made of the
changes over time in the way that religious groups interpret racial inequality. The findings
confirm that religion continues to play a role in shaping the frames that individuals use for
interpreting racial inequality, that more precise measures are important for understanding racial
attitudes, and that frames for racial inequality have in fact changed over time. However, the
findings and conclusions here may raise many questions. Given that different frames for racial
inequality show different patterns of change over time, more research must be done to
understand these changes. Particular attention should be given to the racial attitudes of the nonaffiliated, particularly in light of Hout and Fischer’s (2002) conclusions about the shift among
some political liberals and moderates away from religious affiliation in the 1990s.
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LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
It is important to note the limitations of this research. One limitation is the religious
categories used do not distinguish between whites and non-whites. As Emerson and Smith
(2000) show, racialization within religious groups does in fact make a difference. Future work
should be done to understand how frames may be changing across time for religio-racial groups.
This would be particularly important for a denomination like Catholics who have such a high
percentage of white and non-white adherents.
A second consideration, if not a limitation, is that there were times in the study where a
group was not significant in one decade and significant in the next, but the difference between
decades never reached statistical significance. These are difficult patterns for which to draw
conclusions given that this project set out to assess significant changes across time. While the
lack of significance limits the conclusions that can actually be drawn in these cases, I believe that
the fact that nearly every case where this happened occurred with the 1990s points to the need
for more research to explore the effects of the flight from organized religion described by Hout
and Fischer (2002).
Finally, in every case where church attendance was significant, the direction of the slope
was in an unanticipated direction. It is unclear why this was the case.
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Table 1: Response Patterns for Seven Frames for Racial Inequality by Denomination

Frames for Racial Inequality
Individualist
Ability
Motivation
Mixed
Ability + Structuralism
Motivation + Structuralism
Structuralist
Education
Discrimination
None

Response Patterns
Individualist Responses
Structuralist Responses
Ability
Motivation
Education
Discrimination
Yes
No

Yes or No
Yes

No
No

No
No

Yes
No

Yes or No
Yes

Yes (or)
Yes (or)

Yes
Yes

No
No
No

No
No
No

Yes
Yes or No
No

No
Yes
No
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Table 2: Frames for Racial Inequality for Each Denomination

Ability
Motivation
Ability +
Structuralism
Motivation +
Structuralism
Education
Discrimination
None
N

Evangelical
8.1%
29.8%
7.5%

Mainline
Protestant
6.9%
22.1%
7.9%

Catholic
6.5%
21.3%
8.9%

Black
Protestant
4.0%
16.2%
9.8%

Jewish
2.3%
13.3%
8.7%

Other
3.5%
16.1%
6.6%

NonAffiliated
3.1%
18.4%
5.2%

18.2%

19.3%

19.9%

19.1%

18.6%

20.4%

16.1%

7.9%
17.3%
11.2%
4,365

12.4%
22.3%
9.1%
3,152

10.9%
21.2%
11.1%
4,286

8.6%
31.9%
10.4%
2,200

16.5%
31.0%
9.6%
345

11.1%
31.9%
10.4%
954

13.5%
32.4%
11.3%
2,036
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Table 3: Response Patterns for Seven Frames for Racial Inequality by Denomination
Evangelical
Ability
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008
Δ
Motivation
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008

Δ

Ability +
Structuralism
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008
Δ
Motivation +
Structuralism
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008
Δ
Education
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008
Δ
Discrimination
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008
Δ
None
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008
Δ
N
1985-1993
1994-2000
2002-2008

Mainline
Protestant

Catholic

Black
Protestant

Jewish

Other

NonAffiliated

12.2%
6.6%
3.9%
-67.7%

8.3%
6.6%
4.8%
-42.2%

8.2%
5.6%
5.4%
-33.7%

2.3%
2.9%
5.4%
+139.9%

3.4%
1.4%
2.4%
-29.8%

4.7%
3.5%
1.9%
-59.4%

4.4%
2.8%
2.8%
-36.9%

26.9%
30.7%
32.8%
+21.7%

19.7%
23.1%
24.9%
+25.9%

19.2%
21.6%
24.0%
+25.1%

6.6%
9.4%
24.0%
+263.7%

15.3%
12.9%
11.9%
17.1%
13.1%
18.8%
-14.2% +45.6%

14.4%
17.7%
21.7%
+50.7%

9.6%
6.8%
5.1%
-62.0%

10.3%
6.8%
5.1%
-50.6%

11.0%
7.5%
8.1%
-26.5%

15.7%
8.1%
8.1%
-48.2%

10.2%
7.7%
8.3%
-18.1%

7.5%
7.5%
4.2%
-44.2%

5.4%
4.8%
5.5%
+1.9%

21.3%
15.5%
17.2%
-18.9%

22.8%
17.2%
16.2%
-29.2%

21.9%
19.0%
18.6%
-14.9%

19.4%
19.7%
18.6%
-3.8%

22.9%
15.4%
17.9%
-22.0%

25.2%
19.5%
16.1%
-36.0%

23.8%
14.9%
12.3%
-48.3%

6.0%
8.9%
9.4%
+56.5%

10.9%
12.6%
14.8%
+35.8%

9.9%
11.0%
12.1%
+22.7%

4.9%
5.1%
12.1%
+145.2%

9.3%
23.8%
14.3%
+53.2%

11.3%
10.9%
11.1%
-1.9%

12.9%
12.7%
14.8%
+14.3%

17.1%
18.8%
15.6%
-8.4%

23.1%
22.2%
21.1%
-8.5%

23.6%
21.5%
17.5%
-26.0%

47.6%
46.1%
17.5%
-63.3%

32.2%
28.7%
33.3%
+3.5%

33.3%
30.4%
32.2%
-3.4%

33.0%
34.1%
30.0%
-9.0%

6.9%
12.7%
15.9%
+130%

4.9%
11.5%
13.2%
+170.2%

6.1%
13.8%
14.2%
131.1%

3.5%
8.8%
14.2%
304.%

6.8%
11.2%
10.7%
58.0%

5.0%
11.2%
15.7%
212.2%

6.1%
13.1%
12.9%
112.5%

1694
1557
1114

1292
1180
680

1548
1617
1121

485
594
1121

118
143
84

318
375
261

479
834
723
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Table 4: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of Seven Frames for Racial Inequality, 1985-2008

Evangelical
Mainline
Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male

Ability
.517 / 1.676
(.175)**
.499 / 1.647
(.177)**
.620 / 1.860
(.174)**
.490 / 1.632
(.331)
-.390 / .677
(.482)
.084 / 1.088
(.266)
-.004 / .996
(.083)
.020 / 1.020
(.002)***
-.294 / .746
(.099)**
-1.165 / .312
(.151)***
-1.472 / .230
(.239)***
.033 / 1.034
(.018)
.064 / 1.066
(.029)*
.365 / 1.441
(.078)***

Motivation
.570 / 1.768
(.083)***
.384 / 1.468
(.084)***
.377 / 1.458
(.082)***
.561 / 1.753
(.160)***
-.045 / .956
(.191)
.230 / 1.259
(.121)
.071 / 1.074
(.043)
-.008 / .992
(.001)***
.046 / 1.047
(.062)
-.301 / .740
(.076)***
-.693 / .500
(.109)***
.047 / 1.048
(.010)***
.122 / 1.129
(.016)***
.164 / 1.178
(.041)***

Ability +
Structuralism
-.070 / .932
(.146)
.098 / 1.103
(.146)
.246 / 1.278
(.140)
.045 / 1.046
(.196)
.561 / 1.752
(.264)*
-.131 / .877
(.213)
.031 / 1.032
(.074)
.024 / 1.024
(.002)***
-.337 / .714
(.083)***
-.963 / .382
(.129)***
-1.569 / .208
(.233)***
-.063 / .939
(.013)***
-.001 / .999
(.025)
.058 / 1.059
(.070)

Motivation +
Structuralism
.133 / 1.142
(.089)
.166 / 1.181
(.088)
.164 / 1.178
(.085)
-.017 / .983
(.127)
.368 / 1.446
(.159)*
.146 / 1.157
(.119)
-.069 / .933
(.046)
.000 / 1.000
(.001)
.172 / 1.187
(.067)*
.142 / 1.153
(.080)
-.069 / .933
(.107)
-.003 / .997
(.010)
.045 / 1.046
(.016)***
-.048 / .953
(.044)

52

Education
-.244 / .783
(.108)*
-.023 / .978
(.100)
-.079 / .924
(.098)
.215 / .806
(.205)
-.087 / .917
(.175)
-.121 / .886
(.394)
.034 / 1.035
(.059)
-.011 / .989
(.002)***
.715 / 2.045
(.130)**
1.210 / 3.354
(.136)***
1.396 / 4.037
(.149)***
.058 / 1.059
(.017)***
-.037 / .964
(.021)
.081 / 1.085
(.056)

Discrimination
-.377 / .686
(.077)***
-.289 / .749
(.074)***
-.413 / .662
(.072)***
-.133 / .875
(.102)
-.125 / .882
(.133)
-.049 / .952
(.613)
-.134 / .874
(.043)***
-.005 / .995
(.001)***
.266 / 1.304
(.066)***
.556 / 1.743
(.075)***
.848 / 2.335
(.090)***
.006 / 1.006
(.009)
-.220 / .803
(.015)***
-.207 / .813
(.041)***

None
-.016 / .984
(.111)
-.095 / .910
(.112)
.077 / 1.080
(.105)
-.163 / .849
(.181)
-.111 / .895
(.222)
-.054 / .947
(.154)
.134 / 1.144
(.061)*
-.011 / .989
(.002)***
.051 / 1.052
(.094)
.153 / 1.165
(.106)
.183 / 1.201
(.134)
-.014 / .986
(.013)
.094 / 1.098
(.022)***
-.009 / .991
(.057)

Rural
South
Attendance
Religious
Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year
Constant
N
Chi-square
Cox & Snell R2

.121 / 1.129
(.085)
.388 / 1.474
(.094)***
-.044 / .957
(.016)**
.306/ 1.359
(.087)***
-1.126 / .324
(.267)***
-.199 / .819
(.178)
-.048 / .953
(.006)***
91.592
777
524.499***
.038

.154 / 1.166
(.046)***
.287 / 1.332
(.052)***
-.029 / .972
(.009)***
.081 / 1.084
(.048)
-1.165 / .312
(.128)***
-.343 / .710
(.090)***
.024 / 1.025
(.003)***
-51.257
3023
749.042***
.036

-.128 / .880
(.081)
.053 / 1.054
(.090)
-.033 / .968
(.014)*
.340 / 1.404
(.077)***
.248 / 1.281
(.144)
.352 / 1.423
(.135)*
-.011 / .989
(.005)*
18.260
970
513.741***
.025

-.013 / .987
(.052)
-.073 / .929
(.060)
.003 / 1.003
(.009)
-.103 / .902
(.052)*
.300 / 1.350
(.091)***
.267 / 1.306
(.089)**
-.011 / .989
(.003)***
20.553
2531
71.090***
.004

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).

53

-.166 / .847
(.071)*
-.074 / .928
(.083)
.018 / 1.018
(.012)
-.375 / .687
(.078)***
-.561 / .571
(.152)***
-.529 / .589
(.141)***
.017 / 1.017
(.004)***
-36.380
1483
571.013***
.028

.044 / 1.045
(.049)
-.360 / .698
(.060)***
.018 / 1.018
(.009)*
-.244 / .784
(.050)***
.801 / 2.227
(.076)***
.208 / 1.232
(.087)*
-.004 / .996
(.003)
7.910
3272
1043.705***
.050

-.075 / .927
(.068)
.155 / 1.167
(.074)*
.018 / 1.018
(.012)
.048 / 1.049
(.069)
-.293 / .746
(.134)*
-.179 / .836
(.119)
.053 / 1.055
(.004)***
-108.711
1461
247.715***
.018

Table 5: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Motivation Frame by Decade

Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male
Rural
South
Attendance
Religious Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year

Constant

1985-1993
.892 / 2.440
(185)***
.580 / 1.787
(.186)**
.652 / 1.920
(.185)***
.770 / 2.160
(.369)*
.198 / 1.218
(.374)
.267 / 1.306
(.254)
.091 / 1.096
(.083)
-.003 / .997
(.002)
.001 / 1.001
(.107)
-.386 / .680
(.142)**
-.628 / .533
(.207)**
.043 / 1.043
(.018)*
.104 / 1.110
(.030)***
.266 / 1.305
(.077)***
.130 / 1.138
(.085)
.269 / 1.309
(.099)**
-.052 / .949
(.016)***
-.043 / .958
(.090)
-1.061 / .202
(.304)***
-.061 / .940
(.186)
.130 / 1.139
(.016)***
-261.770

1994-2000
.447 / 1.563
(.134)***
.362 / 1.436
(.135)**
.258 / 1.295
(.131)*
.242 / 1.274
(.260)
-.266 / .767
(.304)
.211 / 1.235
(.193)
.030 / 1.031
(.070)
-.011 / .989
(.002)***
-.019 / .981
(.105)
-.403 / .668
(.125)***
-1.005 / .366
(.185)***
.059 / 1.061
(.018)***
.126 / 1.135
(.025)***
.115 / 1.121
(.067)
.073 / 1.076
(.075)
.212 / 1.236
(.085)*
-.005 / .995
(.014)
.191 / 1.210
(.078)*
-1.127 / .324
(.199)***
-.394 / .674
(.156)*
-.051 / .950
(.015)***
99.355
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2002-2008
.422 / 1.525
(.135)**
.250 / 1.284
(.140)
.279 / 1.322
(.131)*
.711 / 2.035
(.248)**
.025 / 1.026
(.338)
.208 / 1.231
(.203)
.150 / 1.162
(.077)*
-.008 / .992
(.002)***
.129 / 1.137
(.116)
-.169 / .844
(.135)
-.439 / .645
(.184)*
.020 / 1.020
(.019)
.137 / 1.147
(.028)***
.163 / 1.177
(.073)*
.284 / 1.329
(.082)***
.364 / 1.439
(.091)***
-.032 / .969
(.016)*
.096 / 1.100
(.087)
-.981 / .375
(.203)***
-.336 / .715
(.140)*
.008 / 1.008
(.017)
-18.026

874
N
325.745***
Chi-square
.051
Cox & Snell R2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).

1,188
314.461***
.045
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961
199.267***
.031

Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Ability + Structuralism Frame by Decade

Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male
Rural
South
Attendance
Religious Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year

Constant

1985-1993
.027 / 1.028
(.281)
.256 / 1.291
(.279)
.524 / 1.690
(.276)
.298 / 1.347
(.380)
.215 / 1.240
(.529)
-.245 / .783
(.392)
-.002 / .998
(.118)
.025 / 1.025
(.003)***
-.381 / .683
(.132)**
-.607 / .545
(.198)**
-.933 / .393
(.326)**
-.047 / .954
(.021)*
-.025 / .975
(.041)
.070 / 1.072
(.112)
.107 / 1.113
(.120)
.255 / 1.290
(.139)
-.010 / .990
(.022)
.364 / 1.439
(.121)**
-.121 / .886
(.266)
-.058 / .943
(.269)
.056 / 1.058
(.022)*
-115.205

1994-2000
.075 / 1.078
(.237)
.166 / 1.180
(.238)
.154 / 1.167
(.230)
-.191 / .826
(.316)
.655 / 1.926
(.405)
.140 / 1.150
(.330)
-.046 / 1.103
(.026)
.098 / 1.025
(.125)
.025 / .641
(.003)***
-.445 / .243
(.141)**
-1.413 / .123
(.231)***
-.063 / .939
(.022)**
.004 / 1.004
(.042)
-.022 / .978
(.119)
-.518 / .596
(.150)***
-.134 / .874
(.160)
-.070 / .932
(.023)**
.412 / 1.509
(.128)***
.436 / 1.547
(.227)
.489 / 1.630
(.232)*
-.046 / .955
(.026)
89.874
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2002-2008
-.431 / .650
(.270)
-.244 / .784
(.280)
.020 / 1.020
(.246)
.161 / 1.175
(.247)
.873 / 2.394
(.476)
-.390 / .677
(.436)
.043 / 1.044
(.151)
.024 / 1.024
(.004)***
-.190 / .827
(.175)
-.923 / .398
(.255)***
-1.946 / .143
(.538)***
-.097 / .907
(.025)***
.046 / 1.047
(.051)
.141 / 1.152
(.142)
-.036 / .964
(.170)
.013 / 1.103
(.183)
-.017 / .983
(.029)
.231 / 1.260
(.162)
.442 / 1.555
(.279)
.675 / 1.965
(.228)**
.016 / 1.016
(.034)
-35.648

N
Chi-square
Cox & Snell R2

401
190.963***
.030

342
243.503***
.035

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).
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227
148.870***
.024

Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Motivation + Structuralism Frame by
Decade

Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male
Rural
South
Attendance
Religious Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year

1985-1993
-.257 / .773
(.153)
-.247 / .781
(.149)
-.290 / .748
(.149)
-.425 / .654
(.232)
.142 / 1.153
(.261)
-.143 / .866
(.195)
.069 / 1.072
(.078)
-.002 / .998
(.002)
.226 / 1.253
(.107)*
.249 / 1.283
(.130)
.112 / 1.118
(.177)
-.002 / .998
(.016)
.053 / 1.054
(.027)
-.071 / .931
(.073)
.003 / 1.003
(.084)
-.158 / .854
(.104)
.010 / 1.010
(.015)
-.064 / .938
(.086)
-.029 / .972
(.168)
-.037 / .963
(.183)
.093 / 1.097
(.015)***

1994-2000
.049 / 1.050
(.149)
.153 / 1.165
(.146)
.180 / 1.198
(.140)
-.016 / .984
(.207)
.098 / 1.103
(.268)
.140 / 1.150
(.197)
-.074 / .929
(.077)
.003 / 1.003
(.002)
.038 / 1.038
(.114)
-.080 / .923
(.135)
-.224 / .800
(.175)
.001 / 1.001
(.017)
.014 / 1.015
(.027)
-.035 / .965
(.074)
-.054 / .948
(.088)
-.032 / .968
(.099)
.014 / 1.014
(.016)
-.153 / .858
(.087)
.425 / 1.530
(.148)**
.445 / 1.561
(.147)**
-.079 / .924
(.016)***
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2002-2008
.471 / 1.601
(.168)**
.443 / 1.558
(.173)**
.506 / 1.658
(.160)**
.257 / 1.292
(.230)
.808 / 2.243
(.318)*
.136 / 1.146
(.252)
-.212 / .809
(.091)*
-.001 / .999
(.003)
.155 / 1.168
(.136)
.203 / 1.226
(.156)
-.163 / .850
(.216)
-.035 / .965
(.019)
.087 / 1.091
(.032)**
-.040 / .961
(.087)
.045 / 1.046
(.105)
-.042 / .959
(.116)
-.016 / .984
(.018)
-.059 / .943
(.103)
.564 / 1.758
(.167)
.369 / 1.447
(.149)
.017 / 1.017
(.021)

-186.644
Constant
981
N
73.013***
Chi-square
.012
Cox & Snell R2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).

155.008
918
60.815***
.009

59

-35.812
632
63.252***
.010

Table 8: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates for the Education Frame by Decade

Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male
Rural
South
Attendance
Religious Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year

Constant

1985-1993
-.508 /.602
(.226)*
-.097 / .908
(.205)
-.159 / .853
(.207)
-.108 / .898
(.417)
-.725 / .484
(.430)
-.072 / .931
(.275)
.006 / 1.006
(.114)
-.009 / .991
(.004)**
1.001 / 2.722
(.236)***
1.317 / 3.734
(.253)***
1.522 / 4.582
(.283)***
.071 / 1.073
(.029)*
-.037 / .964
(.041)
.023 / 1.024
(.107)
.137 / 1.147
(.125)
.058 / 1.059
(.159)
.022 / 1.022
(.023)
-.297 / .743
(.142)*
-.767 / .464
(.328)*
.045 / 1.045
(.263)
.155 / 1.167
(.023)***
-311.560

1994-2000
-.238 / .788
(.170)
-.044 / .957
(.157)
-.139 / .870
(.155)
-.098 / .906
(.328)
.246 / 1.278
(.240)
-.104 / .901
(.223)
.018 / 1.018
(.093)
-.012 / .988
(.003)***
.830 / 2.293
(.230)***
1.396 / 4.037
(.238)***
1.599 / 4.949
(.255)***
.060 / 1.062
(.027)*
-.034 / .967
(.033)
.102 / 1.108
(.088)
-.111 / .895
(.111)
-.154 / .857
(.129)
.015 / 1.015
(.020)
-.426 / .653
(.125)***
-.589 / .555
(.247)*
-.460 / .631
(.232)*
-.056 / .946
(.020)**
108.352
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2002-2008
-.145 / .865
(.185)
-.038 / .962
(.173)
-.018 / .982
(.164)
-.446 / .640
(.350)
-.389 / .678
(.357)
-.257 / .773
(.258)
.074 / 1.076
(.105)
-.012 / .988
(.003)***
.233 / 1.262
(.217)
.785 / 2.192
(.224)***
.956 / 2.602
(.247)***
.029 / 1.030
(.030)
-.041 / .960
(.037)
.162 / 1.175
(.100)
-.565 / .568
(.144)***
-.094 / .910
(.153)
.024 / 1.024
(.022)
-.360 / .698
(.140)*
-.402 / .669
(.244)
-.987 / .373
(.246)***
.034 / 1.034
(.024)
-70.216

410
N
208.066***
Chi-square
.033
Cox & Snell R2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).

611
251.585***
.036
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462
177.348***
.028

Table 9: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates for the Discrimination Frame by Decade

Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male
Rural
South
Attendance
Religious Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year

Constant

1985-1993
-.362 / .696
(.149)*
-.240 / .786
(.142)
-.298 / .743
(.142)*
-.108 / .898
(.197)
-.010 / .990
(.248)
-.097 / .907
(.187)
-.088 / .916
(.076)
-.012 / .988
(.002)***
.211 / 1.235
(.109)
.612 / 1.844
(.128)***
.849 / 2.388
(.162)***
-.008 / .992
(.015)
-.188 / .828
(.027)***
-.139 / .870
(.072)
.116 / 1.123
(.086)
-.351 / .704
(.109)***
.011 / 1.011
(.015)
-.304 / .738
(.088)***
.755 / 2.218
(.141)***
.201 / 1.222
(.251)
.126 / 1.135
(.015)***
-251.749

1994-2000
-.493 / .611
(.123)***
-.498 / .608
(.119)***
-.544 / .580
(.115)***
-.120 / .887
(.165)
-.487 / .614
(.213)*
-.218 / .804
(.157)
-.102 / .903
(.068)
-.003 / .997
(.002)
.322 / 1.381
(.112)**
.657 / 1.929
(.126)***
1.015 / 2.760
(.148)***
-.007 / .993
(.015)
-.234 / .791
(.024)***
-.264 / .768
(.066)***
.112 / 1.118
(.079)
-.464 / .629
(.095)***
.022 / 1.022
(.014)
-.207 / .813
(.081)*
.925 / 2.522
(.124)***
.144 / 1.155
(.149)
-.090 / .914
(.014)***
179.437
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2002-2008
-.440 / .644
(.141)**
-.230 / .794
(.137)
-.544 / .580
(.131)***
-.337 / .714
(.189)
.052 / 1.053
(.247)
.068 / 1.071
(.177)
-.183 / .833
(.082)*
-.001 / .999
(.002)
.124 / 1.131
(.130)
.266 / 1.305
(.145)
.557 / 1.745
(.169)***
.019 / 1.020
(.019)
-.251 / .778
(.028)***
-.179 / .836
(.078)*
-.162 / .851
(.101)
-.237 / .789
(.116)*
.031 / 1.032
(.017)
-.161 / .852
(.099)
.756 / 2.129
(.140)***
.329 / 1.390
(.142)*
-.003 / .997
(.018)
5.128

1,058
N
399.230***
Chi-square
.062
Cox & Snell R2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).

1,277
525.663***
.074
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852
276.110***
.043

Table 10: Binary Logistic Regression for the None Frame by Decade

Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Black Protestant
Jewish
Other
Married
Age
High School
College
Beyond College
Income
Conservative
Male
Rural
South
Attendance
Religious Orthodoxy
Black
Hispanic
Year

Constant

1985-1993
.143 / 1.154
(.289)
-.020 / .980
(.292)
.254 / 1.289
(.284)
.121 / 1.129
(.545)
.295 / 1.343
(.495)
-.013 / .987
(.394)
-.075 / .928
(.141)
-.008 / .992
(.004)
-.164 / .849
(.188)
.023 / 1.024
(.229)
.121 / 1.129
(.298)
-.027 / .974
(.028)
.044 / 1.045
(.050)
.177 / 1.193
(.132)
-.233 / .792
(.154)
.453 / 1.573
(.164)**
.017 / 1.017
(.027)
.159 / 1.172
(.155)
-.867 / .420
(.430)*
-.719 / .487
(.384)
.054 / 1.056
(.027)
-110.332

1994-2000
-.170 / .844
(-.093)
-.093 / .911
(.165)
.066 / 1.068
(.156)
-.296 / .744
(.267)
.002 / 1.002
(.307)
-.235 / .791
(.237)
.176 / 1.192
(.092)
-.017 / .983
(.003)***
.156 / 1.168
(.152)
.266 / 1.305
(.269)
.291 / 1.338
(.208)
-.030 / .970
(.021)
.133 / 1.142
(.032)***
.049 / 1.051
(.086)
.039 / 1.040
(.101)
.084 / 1.088
(.114)
.036 / 1.037
(.019)
-.050 / .951
(.105)
-.179 / .836
(.192)
-.183 / .833
(.192)
.084 / 1.088
(.019)
-169.379
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2002-2008
.119 / 1.127
(.176)
-.088 / .916
(.183)
-.013 / .988
(.169)
-.063 / .939
(.283)
-.572 / .564
(.449)
.195 / 1.215
(.242)
.241 / 1.273
(.101)*
-.006 / .994
(.003)
.058 / 1.060
(.158)
.099 / 1.104
(.178)
.134 / 1.144
(.223)
.001 / 1.001
(.024)
.059 / 1.061
(.036)
-.155 / .856
(.096)
-.164 / .849
(.118)
.098 / 1.103
(.125)
-.001 / .999
(.020)
.119 / 1.127
(.114)
-.295 / .745
(.211)
.029 / 1.030
(.173)
-.029 / .972
(.023)
55.767

263
N
38.993***
Chi-square
.009
Cox & Snell R2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two tailed tests).

661
100.880***
.019

65

537
36.296*
.009
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